A proposed amendment to the UK’s Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill would require age-verification rules to be applied to VPNs, effectively treating VPN use as something that must be blocked or restricted in order to enforce online age gates.
This matters because VPNs are not niche tools used to “get around the rules.” They are a core part of how the modern Internet stays secure. Businesses, journalists, researchers, students, healthcare workers, and ordinary people use VPNs every day to protect sensitive data, work safely on public networks, and reduce exposure to tracking and abuse, and have been doing so for decades. Weakening or blocking VPNs has a wide-ranging impact: it affects how people work, learn, and stay safe online. Restricting consumer VPN usage unfairly puts individual privacy and security at risk while businesses, government agencies, and other institutions continue to use the very same technology.
The idea behind VPN-blocking sounds simple, but it breaks down immediately in practice. There is no reliable way to tell where a VPN user is physically located, which means any requirement to block “UK VPN users” would either force websites to block all VPN traffic everywhere or to withdraw services entirely. We have already seen this kind of overblocking happen in other jurisdictions when compliance becomes unworkable, including cases where platforms have withdrawn services or blocked entire regions rather than attempt technically infeasible enforcement. Documented examples of this pattern can be found in multiple international case studies collected by the Internet Infrastructure Coalition.
The amendment has passed the House of Lords and is now back before the House of Commons, which must decide whether to accept, reject, or modify it. This is the point in the process where real-world consequences still matter. MPs have to consider whether a proposal can actually be implemented, what collateral damage it would cause, and who would be harmed in the process.
To help ground that discussion, the VPN Trust Initiative and the Internet Infrastructure Coalition have published a joint analysis explaining why VPN-blocking in age-verification laws is misguided, technically unworkable, and harmful to online safety and security overall.
You can read the full piece here:
We are sharing this widely with UK civil society, digital rights organizations, policymakers, and industry stakeholders so that decisions about child safety are informed by how the Internet actually works. If you care about privacy, security, education, journalism, or the basic ability to use the Internet safely, now is the moment to engage.
Please read, share, and use this analysis in your conversations. This is not about opposing child safety. It is about choosing solutions that protect young people without breaking the security tools that millions of people rely on every day.
What you can do now
This amendment is now before the House of Commons, which means there is still time to influence how it is understood and whether it moves forward. Clear, practical input matters most at this stage, before assumptions about feasibility and impact harden into policy.
If you are part of a civil society organization, educational institution, media organization, or business with UK operations, please read and share this analysis with MPs, parliamentary staff, and partners engaging on the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill. Use it to explain, in concrete terms, why blocking VPNs will not work and who it will harm.
UK residents can find and contact their Member of Parliament here:
https://members.parliament.uk/members/Commons
A short, plain-language message referencing this analysis and explaining the real-world consequences of VPN-blocking is often the most effective.
You can also share this piece directly in your outreach:
Suggested Messaging (You can copy and paste this):
I’m writing regarding the proposed amendment to the Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill that would apply age-verification requirements to VPN use.
VPNs are not niche circumvention tools, and have been utilized for decades. They are widely used and relied upon by businesses, journalists, students, healthcare workers, and ordinary people to keep data secure and to work and learn safely online. Treating VPN use as something that must be blocked in order to enforce age gates creates serious security, privacy, and implementation problems.
There is no reliable way to identify the physical location of a VPN user, which means this proposal would either result in widespread overblocking or force VPN services to withdraw entirely from the UK. That kind of collateral damage would affect legitimate users far more than it would improve child safety.
A joint analysis by the VPN Trust Initiative and the Internet Infrastructure Coalition explains these issues in detail and outlines more effective, evidence-based approaches to online safety that do not undermine core Internet security tools:
Why VPN-Blocking in Age-Verification Laws Is Misguided, Unworkable, and Harmful
I hope you will consider these practical consequences carefully as the House of Commons decides how to proceed.